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A A A ABSTRACT BSTRACT BSTRACT BSTRACT       
       
Discretionary  firm  donation  is  usually  related  to  the  stakeholder  theory  and  corporate  social  performance. 
Although theoretical explanations for this social behavior are pervasive in related literature, empirical modeling 
remains underdeveloped. We developed an explanatory structural model of discretionary firm donation using 
firm and industry level indicators. Unlike previous research, we estimated the explanatory power of the construct 
we called stakeholder orientation. Our tentative model was tested on a Brazilian sample of 101 publicly traded 
donor firms, using data on firm donations to social projects and to political candidates in electoral campaigns. 
The main results suggest that discretionary donation seems to be a strategy for managing conflicting claims in 
highly stakeholder oriented firms; the characteristics of the firm are more important than industry effects in 
explaining firm donations; and large firms, showing slack resources, and with a less concentrated ownership 
structure tend to engage in discretionary donation more intensively. 
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I I I INTRODUCTION NTRODUCTION NTRODUCTION NTRODUCTION       
       
       
Discretionary firm donation is usually associated to the stakeholder theory (Adams & Hardwick, 
1998; Waddock & Graves, 1997), corporate social performance (McGuire, Sundgren, & Schneeweis, 
1988; Ullmann, 1985) and corporate political strategies (Lenway & Rehbein, 1991; Roberts, 1992). 
Different  theoretical  explanations  of  why  and  how  intensely  a  firm  should  engage  in  such  social 
behavior is pervasive in related literature; however, they do not converge (Freeman, 1999). One can 
rely  on  the  reasoning  of  maximizing  conventional  financial  performance,  as  advocated  by  the 
instrumental stakeholder theory, or on the social imperative of maximizing all stakeholders’ gains, as 
the ultimate objective of the firm, an assumption of the normative stakeholder theory (Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995). 
Despite  theoretical  pervasiveness,  empirical  research  on  corporate  donation  activities  is  still 
underdeveloped. As Harrison and Freeman (1999) point out, business and society is relatively young 
as a discipline and, therefore, its empirical tools are only beginning to be developed. Some exceptions 
are  the  work  of  Adams  and  Hardwick  (1998),  who  attempted  to  model  company-specific  factors 
associated to levels of discretionary firm donations, the study of social responsibility disclosure by 
Roberts  (1992),  who  used  firms’  contributions  to  political  parties  and  cash  given  to  charity  as 
independent  variables,  and  the  longitudinal  analysis  of  Campbell,  Moore  and  Metzger  (2002). 
“Linkages between the level of donations and company-specific characteristics, such as leverage and 
firm  size,  could  help  stakeholders  such  as  shareholders,  creditors  and  customers  to  make  better 
informed business decisions” (Adams & Hardwick, 1998, p. 642). 
In  Brazil,  research  into  stakeholder  theory  and  corporate  social  responsibility  is  essentially 
descriptive  (Almeida,  Fontes,  &  Martins,  2000;  Alves,  2001;  Ashley,  Coutinho,  &  Tomei,  2000; 
Coelho, 2004; Coutinho & Macedo-Soares, 2002; Serpa & Fourneau, 2007), developed under the case 
study research design (Andrade, 2000; Kreitlon & Quintella, 2001; Machado & Lage, 2002; Xavier & 
Souza, 2004), or with a focus on managerial perception (Garay, 2006; Macke & Carrion, 2006; Serpa, 
2006).  Some  studies  associate  corporate  social  responsibility  with  firm  performance  using  large 
datasets (Alberton, 2003; Campos, 2003; Souza & Marcon, 2003), but none of these addresses the 
issue of firm donation behavior. 
We  intend  to  fill  this  gap  by  testing  an  explanatory  model  of  discretionary  firm  donations  by 
Brazilian  firms.  We  argue  that  explanations  for  the  firm  donation  phenomenon  should  take  into 
account the complexity of both industry and organizational settings. Previous research used regression 
models  with a parsimonious selection of key  variables  with low shared variance and  high unique 
contribution (Adams & Hardwick, 1998). Differently, our model develops and tests what we call the 
stakeholder orientation concept, a firm-level construct that takes into account relevant organizational 
characteristics all together. We seek to understand not the isolated effects of independent variables, but 
the profile of firms more prone to engage in high levels of corporate donations. 
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We draw from the stakeholder theory (Cornell & Shapiro, 1987; Hill & Jones, 1992; Roberts, 1992; 
Ullmann,  1985)  and  related  research  on  corporate  social  responsibility  and  corporate  social 
performance (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Harrison & Freeman, 1999; Hillman & Keim, 2001) to 
explain firm donations. Following Adams and Hardwick (1998), we consider “that stakeholder theory 
has intuitive appeal in providing insights into why companies might make discretionary payments to 
support charitable and other social activities” (p. 644). Before we present the research hypotheses, two 
questions within the realms of the stakeholder theory need to be addressed: to whom and why make 
donations. Drivers of Discretionary Firm Donations in Brazil 
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We focus on discretionary donations to primary stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995), specifically, for two 
broad,  aggregated  groups,  namely  government  and  community.  These  two  groups  have  notorious 
salience to firm management in Brazil. The characteristics of a weak, erratic and hostile government 
(Pearce, 2001) exerts a negative influence on business firms, forcing them to seek protection or some 
form of association in order to survive and to profit. As suggested by Smith (1994), in emerging 
countries, such as Brazil, Taiwan and Hungary, uncluttered by social initiatives, even small, well-
conceived grant programs might have a large impact on the success of a firm. The relevance of the 
government stakeholder is evident when the implementation of stakeholder principles depends upon 
government  intervention  and  regulation  (Buchholz  &  Rosenthal,  2004;  Freeman,  1998;  Keim  & 
Baysinger,  1988).  According  to  Freeman  and  Reed  (1983),  even  in  developed  countries,  the 
government, as well as its regulatory agencies, has had increasingly more power. The community 
stakeholder is also important to a firm’s strategic management (Altman, 1998; Berman, Wicks, Kotha, 
& Jones, 1999; Waddock & Graves, 1997). In Brazil, Schommer (2000) and Coelho (2004) used 
donation to social projects as a proxy for the relationship between the firm and the community. 
Stakeholder theory provides conceptual grounds to explain why firms engage in donation activities. 
According to Donaldson and Preston (1995), stakeholder theory may view the firm as a nexus of 
explicit  and  implicit  contracts  among  multiple  stakeholders,  similar  to  transaction  cost  economy 
(Williamson & Winter, 1991) or to agency theory (Jensen & Mechling, 1976). If managers are to 
coordinate such contracts in ways that the firm will benefit from superior conventional performance in 
the long run, then one may infer an instrumental reasoning for engaging in firm donations (Jones, 
1995). On the order hand, according to the notion implied by the normative stakeholder theory, this 
coordination effort would only succeed if the underlying instrumental notion of opportunistic behavior 
could be shifted to a more substantive view of stakeholder relationship, based on shared values of 
fairness (Donaldson & Preston, 1995).  
We follow the instrumental reasoning to draw hypothesis on drivers of corporate donation to salient 
stakeholders. We conceptualize the level of discretionary donations as being driven by both firm- and 
industry-specific  factors.  As  for  the  firm-level  antecedent,  we  define  the  stakeholder  orientation 
construct.  It  reflects  the  extent  to  which  the  firm  is  oriented  towards  stakeholder  responsiveness. 
Companies with higher stakeholder orientation tend to use corporate donations strategically to take 
into account stakeholder claims and to profit from superior performance. We propose the following: 
H1: Stakeholder orientation drives firm donation intensity. 
We define stakeholder orientation as a firm-level construct. Previous empirical models took into 
account  unique  contributions  of  a  set  of  firm  characteristics  to  explain  firm  donation  (Adams  & 
Hardwick, 1998). In our model, instead of grasping unique variances of each variable, we propose a 
set  of  firm-level  indicators  to  measure  and  to  define  stakeholder  orientation.  We  believe  that  the 
stakeholder orientation construct explain firm donation better than a model with unique individual 
firm characteristics. By composing firm profiles we are better able to take into account the complex 
and interactive features of these organizational phenomena. We suggest that the following company-
specific characteristics indicate the stakeholder  orientation profile  of a firm: slack resources, size, 
capital structure and ownership structure.  
Profitability  ratios  may  indicate  the  presence,  or  absence,  of  slack  resources.  We  assume  that 
profitable  firms  are  more  prone  to  engage  in  stakeholder  related  activities.  However,  there  is  no 
consensus about the causal link between financial and social performance (Waddock & Graves, 1997). 
As proposed by Ruf, Muralidhar, Brown, Janney and Paul (2001), investment in social projects leads 
to better financial performance. On the other hand, the greater the financial performance, the greater 
the level of slack resources to be invested in social projects (Adams & Hardwick, 1998; Cochran & 
Wood, 1984; McGuire et al., 1988; Preston & O´Bannon, 1997; Roberts, 1992; Ullmann, 1985). To 
account for this circularity, we measured slack resources by the firm’s past profitability. We then 
propose the following: 
H2: The higher the past profitability of a firm, the higher its stakeholder orientation. Rodrigo Bandeira-de-Mello, Rosilene Marcon, Anete Alberton 
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The other three company-specific characteristics that indicate the level of stakeholder orientation of 
a firm are related to structural factors. First of all, firm size is expected to contribute to knowledge 
concerning its stakeholder orientation profile. Large firms are more visible to the public, receive more 
pressures from organized groups and are expected to make more donations both to the communities 
where they are geographically located, and to the government (Adams & Hardwick, 1998; Cowen, 
Ferreri, & Parker, 1987; Roberts, 1992).  
H3: The larger the firm size, the higher its stakeholder orientation. 
Secondly,  stakeholder  oriented  firms  tend  to  make  specific  decisions  concerning  their  capital 
structure. The level of the firm’s debt is usually considered as a proxy for risk measure (Adams & 
Hardwick, 1998; Cornell & Shapiro, 1987; McGuire et al., 1988; Roberts, 1992). A firm willing to 
continue to satisfy its stakeholders’ implicit claims is expected to avoid incurring financial risks and 
will adopt a low leverage position. Therefore, we posit the following: 
H4: Firms with a strong stakeholder orientation tend to show low levels of firm leverage. 
Finally, ownership concentration may be an indication of stakeholder orientation. Firm ownership 
and governance structures vary across countries due to factors such as the political regime, the legal 
system, the capital market structure and the stability of profit rates (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Siffert, 
1998;  Thomsem  &  Pedersen,  1997).  In  Brazil,  besides  market  regulation,  firm  size  and  capital 
structure determine the level of ownership concentration of firms (Siqueira, 1998). Larger firms tend 
to diversify their ownership structure in order to lower risks and to reduce the cost of capital (Demsetz 
& Lehn, 1985). The market is willing to pay a premium on stocks of firms with a less concentrated 
ownership structure (Vieira & Mendes, 2004). As stated above, large firms are more willing to be 
oriented towards stakeholders as they are  more visible and suffer  more pressure from stakeholder 
groups. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that stakeholder oriented firms show less concentrated 
ownership structures. The positive evaluation of firm governance practices by the market provide an 
incentive  for  stakeholder  oriented  firms  to  diversify  their  ownership  structure.  We  then  posit  the 
following: 
H5: Firms with  a strong stakeholder orientation tend  to show  less concentrated ownership 
structures. 
Literature has also mentioned industry-related antecedents of firm donations. The industry in which 
the company operates influences its donation behavior. Industry structure differences are an important 
economic determinant of firm performance, exert influence on the firm’s strategic actions (McGahan 
&  Porter,  1997;  Porter,  1980)  and  may  entail  differences  in  the  way  incumbents  relate  to  their 
stakeholders, specifically  due to differences in industry concentration (Lenway & Rehbein, 1991). 
Firms that deal with a more regulated environment tend to engage in closer relationships with the 
government than their counterparts in less regulated environments. Samuels (2003), analyzing data on 
Brazilian  donations  to  election  campaigns,  found  an  association  between  political  donation  and 
industry. By the same token, firms  whose activities  pose a greater risk to the community tend to 
develop countermeasures to compensate for possible damage or to form a positive image for the firm 
(Boeira, 2002). Industry effects seem to play a role in firm donations. 
H6: Industry effects drive firm donation intensity. 
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We tested firm and industry-level antecedents of firm donation using Structural Equation Modeling 
[SEM].  According  to  our  hypotheses,  firm  size  and  past  profitability  are  causal,  or  formative, 
indicators  of  stakeholder  orientation,  while  firm  leverage  and  ownership  structure  are  effect,  or 
reflective, indicators. Therefore, stakeholder orientation is empirically defined as a Multiple Indicator Drivers of Discretionary Firm Donations in Brazil 
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Multiple Causes [MIMIC] factor (Kline, 2005). Depicted  in Figure 1, stakeholder  orientation is a 
latent variable represented in an oval. Observed variables are represented in rectangles. To identify the 
model, we constrained the ownership concentration loading to -1, making it the reference item to scale 
the  stakeholder  orientation  construct.  The  negative  sign  reflects  the  inverse  relation  between 
ownership  concentration  and  stakeholder  orientation.  We  allowed  the  cause  indicators  to  covary. 
Measurement errors for the effect indicators of the Stakeholder Orientation factor also were allowed to 
covary, indicating possible common causes of non-explained variation. Figure 1 shows only estimable 
parameters. Every arrow without an explicit parameter indicates a free model parameter. A total of 14 
estimable parameters were free to vary. 
 
Figure 1: Structural Model of Discretionary Firm Donation 
 
 
 
Only data from publicly traded firms were considered due to their reliability. Data were gathered 
from three sources: (1) the ECONOMATICA database (n.d.); (2) the Guia EXAME de boa cidadania 
corporativa (Revista Exame, 2000, 2001, 2002); and (3) official data on firm donation in electoral 
campaigns. The ECONOMATICA database provides the accounting and financial data of listed firms 
on the main stock exchanges and were used to gather data on firm and industry-level variables.  
The Guia EXAME reports social investments and cash giving on several categories. We used it to 
gather data on firm donations to the community stakeholder by adding up yearly firm donations to 
projects  involving:  senior  citizens,  children  and  teenagers,  the  handicapped,  community,  culture, 
health  and  education,  environment  and  social  volunteers.  Official  reports  on  firm  donations  for 
political candidates, in the major electoral campaign of 1998 for President, senators, governors and 
representatives, provided donation data for the government stakeholder. Although there are criticisms 
about the reliability of these measurements, Samuels (2003) points out that Brazilian official data do 
not  consist  of  random  numbers,  and  exploring  them  reveals  patterns  of  donations  between  firms, 
sectors  and  candidates.  Roberts  (1992)  used  corporate  political  action  committee  contributions, 
Balabanis, Philips and Lyall (1998) used donations to a political party, and Adams and Hardwick 
(1998) used discretionary donations to political causes. 
We limited our analysis to a four-year time frame, from 1999 to 2002. Data on yearly donations to 
the  community stakeholder  were collected from 2000 to 2002 (there  were  no comparable  data in 
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1999).  In  our  proposed  model,  firm  donations  are  measured  by  a  composition  of  political 
(government) and social (community) firm donations. All other indicators were average yearly figures. 
Table 1 shows operational definitions for each measured variable. 
 
Table 1: Operational Definitions of Observed Variables 
 
Indicators  Operational Definition 
Firm Donation 
 
This is the sum of political donations and social donations for each firm. Firms’ political 
donations are the amounts donated from each firm to political candidates in the 1998 
election  for  President,  governors,  senators  and  representatives  (US  Dollars).  Firms’ 
social donations are the sum of the amounts donated by  each firm in social projects 
divided by three (years of 2000, 2001 and 2002). Figures are in US Dollars, considering 
the  exchange  rate  on  the  last  business  day  of  each  year.  The  natural  logarithm 
transformation was used to achieve a univariate normal distribution. 
Past Profitability  Yearly average of firms’ profitability (Return on Assets) for 1997 and 1998. 
Leverage 
This  is  the  yearly  average  debt-to-asset  ratio,  considering  the  four-year  time  frame 
(1999-2002).  The  natural  logarithm  transformation  was  used  to  achieve  a  univariate 
normal distribution. 
Firm Size 
This is the average of firms’ total assets in thousands of U.S. dollars considering the 
four-year time  frame  (1999-2002).  The natural  logarithm transformation  was  used  to 
achieve a univariate normal distribution. 
Ownership 
Concentration 
Average  percentage  of  the  total  number  of  shares  that  is  in  possession  of  the  main 
shareholder, for 1999 to 2002. Since we considered the percentage related only to the 
total of voting stocks, this variable can reach the value of 1. 
Industry Effects 
To  capture  industry  differences  on  firm  donations,  we  used  a  measure  of  industry 
donation intensity. It is the ratio of the industry aggregate amount of firm donation to the 
industry’s average firm size. 
 
The research sample consisted only of donating firms listed in 1998 the ECONOMATICA database 
(n.d.). Since we did not sample non-donor firms, our population and generalization attempts refer only 
to the population of donor firms. Our dependent variable measured the donation intensity. Therefore, 
our model explained the drivers of donation intensity after the company has decided to engage in this 
social behavior. 
Comments on how we handled data on firm donations are required. First, our decision to sum up two 
different  variables  –  social  donations,  based  on  an  annual  average  of  three  years,  and  political 
donations in a single year – would attribute more importance to political donations than to social 
donations.  However,  while  social  donations  reflect  a  3-year  average,  political  donation  reflect  an 
election average (four-year period), which would justify our decision. Second, the composition of firm 
donations from political and social donations can be justified by the fact that it is very difficult to 
isolate their unique effects, since donations to the community could have been made to please the 
stakeholder government, and political donations could have been motivated by the firm’s intention to 
indirectly assist a specific community (Adams & Hardwick, 1998). 
We decided to  exclude financial  institutions, due to  their high  leverage ratios, and firms whose 
industry  was  labeled  others  in  the  ECONOMATICA  database.  To  improve  sample  quality,  we 
conducted a microscopic screening, investigating possible causes for atypical data, e.g. extreme values 
of profitability like 500%, in order to decide in favor of their exclusion. To compute yearly averages 
for observed variables, we considered firms having at least two years of data; otherwise we assigned a 
missing  data.  Hence  missing  values  were  generated  by  firms  which  had  informed  atypical, 
miscalculated values, or for firms that did not have at least two years of data (either because it was not 
informed or because the firm went bankrupt, merged or was acquired). The chi-square statistic to test 
for MCAR pattern (missing completely at random) was .517 (p<.676). We then estimated missing 
values using the EM algorithm for data imputation provided by the SPSS 13.  Drivers of Discretionary Firm Donations in Brazil 
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The final sample consisted  of 101 donating firms in 15 industries. Hair, Anderson, Tatham and  
Black  (1998) point  out that at least 5 respondents to parameter are allowed,  with 10 being  more 
acceptable, and a minimum sample size of 50 for ML estimation, but 100-200 being more appropriate. 
Other  suggestions  are  a  minimum  of  100  cases  (Kline,  2005),  15  cases  per  measured  indicator 
(Stevens, 2001), 5 cases per parameter (Bentler & Chou, 1987), all of them considering normality 
assumptions. Our original sample generated, for the final model, 9 cases per parameter and 16.8 cases 
per indicator, very close to minimum requirements. Only the variable past profitability rejected the 
normality hypothesis, for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, at 5%. After variable transformation, outliers 
were not a problem to fit the model. 
We directly estimated the model in Figure 1 using ML estimation performed by AMOS 6.0. The 
Bootstrapt method was used to test for robustness. We also compared our model with a direct effects 
model,  in  which  all  observed  variables  pointed  directly  to  the  dependent  variable,  allowing  for 
covariances among predictors. 
 
       
R R R RESULTS ESULTS ESULTS ESULTS       
       
 
Donating figures ranged from US$ 2,752.29 to US$ 4,900,469.71 (Vale, Mining), with an average of 
US$  575,451.89.  All  other  variables  showed  large  variations.  Table  2  shows  the  means,  standard 
deviations  and  minimum  and  maximum  figures  for  each  variable,  using  original,  not  transformed 
values. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Observable Variables 
 
Original Variables  Min.  Max.  Mean  Std.Dev. 
Firm donation (US$)  2,752.29  4,900,469.71  575,451.89  994,651.13 
Industry Effects  0.0007  0.62  0.25  0.16 
Ownership Concentration (%)  8.55  100  61.92  21.20 
Past Profitability (%)  -112.55  22.40  0.13  14.88 
Leverage  0.16  1.68  0.57  1.46 
Size (1.000 US$)  13,226.79  31,327,284.97  1,772,951.90  3,673,935.80 
 
Table 3 shows the correlation matrix for all observed variables. Except for Leverage, all variables 
show significant correlations with Firm Donations. Other significant correlations indicate that large 
firms  appear  to  have  less  ownership  concentration  levels  (-.248),  and  slack  resources,  or  past 
profitability  (.258).  Firms  which  had  experienced  good  profits  tend  to  be  less  leveraged  in  the 
subsequent period (-.403). 
 
Table 3: Pearson Correlation Matrix for Observable Variables 
 
VARIABLES  1  2  3  4  5 
1. Firm Donation  1         
2. Industry Effects  0.173
*  1       
3. Ownership Concentration  -.251
**  -.088  1     
4. Past Profitability  .357
***  -.141  -.096  1   
5. Leverage  -.062  .188
*  -.168
*  -.403
***  1 
6. Firm Size  .532
***  -.084  -.248
**  .258
***  .015 
***p< .01 **p<.05 *p<.10 
 
The initial estimation of the model in Figure 1 shows poor fit and offending estimates. We decided 
to  eliminate  the  leverage  indicator  for  empirical  reasons  (modification  indexes  and  correlation 
residuals), although it was not theoretically impossible. Indeed, we were attempting to find the best Rodrigo Bandeira-de-Mello, Rosilene Marcon, Anete Alberton 
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indicators for the concept, and this new specification sounded reasonable. However, hypothesis H4 did 
not hold.  
For  the  revised  model,  stakeholder  orientation  had  only  ownership  concentration  as  its  effect 
indicator. The new model was overidentified with 4 degrees of freedom. ML estimation showed no 
offending estimates. Table 4 presents estimated parameters and some measures of fit. 
 
Table 4: Model Parameter Estimates for the Revised Model 
 
Model Parameters  Unstandardized  Std. Error  p-value  Standardized 
Regression Weights         
Stakeholder Orientation￿ Firm Donation  1.726  .712  .015  .752 
Industry Effects ￿ Firm Donation  .253  .083  .002  .236 
Firm Size ￿ Stakeholder Orientation  .369  .158  .019  .643 
Past Profitability ￿ Stakeholder Orientation  .170  .081  .035  .334 
Stakeholder Orientation￿ Ownership Concentration  -1.000      -.301 
 
Covariances         
 Past Profitability ￿  Firm Size  .503  .201  .013  .258 
 
Disturbances and Measurement error variances         
 Stakeholder Orientation  .208  .208  .318   
 Firm Donation  1.142  .636  .073   
 Ownership Concentration  5.718  .835  .000   
Squared Multiple Correlations (R2)         
 Donation   .621       
 Stakeholder Orientation  .636       
Chi-Square 4.237 (p<.375)         
Joreskog GFI .983         
Joreskog AGFI .937         
Steiger-Lind RMSEA .024 (.000-.155) 
NFI .938         
AIC 26.237 
Bollen-Stine bootstrap test p<.222         
 
Our revised model reached acceptable fit. All indexes were fairly acceptable. Only the RMSEA 
index showed mixed results. While the lower bound of its 90% confidence level was zero, indicating a 
good fit of the model with the population, its upper bound was greater than the traditional cut-off value 
of .10. However, this is likely to happen in smaller samples (Kline, 2005). The Bentler-Bonett normed 
fit (NFI) showed values greater than .90, indicating significant improvements from the baseline model 
of  no  correlations  (the  null  model).  We  also  tested  for  robustness  using  bootstrap  methods.  The 
Bollen-Stine bootstrap test did not reject the null hypothesis that the model is correct (p<.222). To 
verify whether our model was better than the direct effects model, we tested for competing models. 
The Akaike Information Criterion [AIC] for a direct-effects only model (.42) was greater than our 
revised model (26.23). As Kline (2005) argues, for testing competing models, the lowest AIC index 
indicates the best model solution.  
Looking at the squared multiple correlations in Table 4, 64% of the stakeholder orientation factor 
variance  was  explained  by  its  indicators,  indicating  a  good  measurement  for  this  construct.  All 
indicators of this construct were significant (p<.05). Therefore, these results support hypotheses H2, 
H3, and H5., i.e., firm size (.643), past profitability (.334), and ownership concentration (-.301) are 
good indicators of the firm’s Stakeholder Orientation level. 
The model explained 62% of firm donation variation. All estimated regression weights in Table 4 
were significant (p<.05) and showed the expected signs. Stakeholder orientation showed a positive 
impact on firm donation (.752). This supported hypothesis H1. Industry effects were also found to be Drivers of Discretionary Firm Donations in Brazil 
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significant, even though their effects on firm performance were less important than the Stakeholder 
Orientation influence (.236). This supported hypothesis H2. 
Finally,  we  re-estimated  the  revised  model  controlling  for  government  ownership  control,  since 
state-controlled firms would be more generous in making donations as a way of implementing public 
policy or a government bargaining strategy with key political actors. This model did not have a good 
fit.  In  fact,  data  did  not  show  any  statistical  differences  between  the  donation  averages  of  state-
controlled firms and the others (p<.630).  
       
       
D D D DISCUSSION AND  ISCUSSION AND  ISCUSSION AND  ISCUSSION AND L L L LIMITATIONS IMITATIONS IMITATIONS IMITATIONS       
       
 
We  examined  drivers  of  discretionary  firm  donation  for  Brazilian  companies.  We  estimated  a 
structural model of firm donation using two exogenous variables: a firm-level construct, stakeholder 
orientation and industry effects. Five of our six initial hypotheses hold for these data. Stakeholder 
orientation and industry effects were found to be significant drivers of levels of firm donation (H1 and 
H2). The concept of Stakeholder Orientation, being measured by firm size (H2), past profitability (H3), 
and ownership concentration (H5) was found to be a better predictor of firm donation intensity than if 
all these indicators were taken separately. The model predicted 62% of the firm donation variance. 
Firm size and slack resources (past profitability) played a major positive role in forming the profile 
of a stakeholder oriented firm. These results converge with previous literature (Adams & Hardwick, 
1998; Cowen et al., 1987; McGuire et al., 1988; Roberts, 1992). Lenway and Rehbein (1991) suggest 
that large firms are more prone to engage in political activity because of (a) their access to resources 
pay the fixed costs of political activity; (b) top managers transfer their prestige to political activity; and 
c) their abundant  expertise.  As  our  measurement  model suggests, large firms are subject to  more 
stakeholder pressures and tend to show a less concentrated ownership structure. This is consistent with 
Ullmann (1985), who posits that firms with less decentralized structures are prone to deal with a large 
number of different stakeholders. 
We did not find support for the influence of stakeholder orientation on firm leverage, even though 
capital structure is usually a relevant indicator of a firm’s social behavior, as we stated in hypothesis 
H4.  Our  findings  on  capital  structure  differ  from  studies  that  were  conducted  abroad  (Adams  & 
Hardwick, 1998; Cornell & Shapiro, 1987; McGuire et al., 1988; Roberts, 1992), indicating possible 
contextual differences in stakeholder management practices. 
Industry characteristics do play a role in explaining donation variation, as we previously expected. 
Conversely, Adams and Hardwick (1998) did not find a significant industry effect in their British data. 
Possible explications are differences in the number of analyzed industries (four broad aggregates in the 
foreign study versus 15 Brazilian industries) and differences in the nature of the institutional setting 
(Luk, Yau, Chow, Tse, & Sin, 2005; Pearce, 2001). 
Stakeholder  orientation  was found to be positively associated  with firm  donations. This  implies 
stakeholder  management  practices  through  corporate  donations.  Stakeholder  orientation  was  more 
important than industry differences in explaining firm donation. One may infer that it is not because 
firm A is operating within industry A, in which donation is more intense, that it will donate more than 
firm B in industry B, less intensive. In fact, what appears to motivate firms to donate more or less is 
their level of stakeholder orientation. 
Finally, unlike previous research (Adams & Hardwick, 1998), the stakeholder orientation concept 
was found to be a better predictor of firm donation intensity than the unique effects of its indicators. 
Future research should focus on developing new indicators, besides past profitability, firm size and 
ownership concentration. The encompassing concept of organizational orientation may better take 
into account the complexity of the stakeholder management practices. Rodrigo Bandeira-de-Mello, Rosilene Marcon, Anete Alberton 
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Limitations  may  call  for  caution  when  analyzing  the  results.  First,  although  we  reached  some 
minimum requirements of sample size, our small sample may have generated inconsistent parameters 
and  decreased  power  in  significance  tests.  However,  the  model  was  not  rejected  in  Bootstrapt 
estimation. Second, despite the fact that data on firm donations to the community were gathered from 
secondary sources and consisted of aggregated values of firm cash giving in projects related to several 
categories, these areas, although significant, may not represent the totality of a firm’s social activities 
(Coelho, 2004; Vergara & Branco, 2001). Indeed, we focused only on two stakeholder groups, the 
community  and  the  government,  which  are  intrinsically  interrelated  (Adams  &  Hardwick,  1998). 
Finding measures capable of capturing every aspect of stakeholder management remains is a challenge 
to the stakeholder theory (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Harrison & Freeman, 1999; Hillman & Keim, 
2001).  
Regarding data quality, several firm projects listed in the Guia EXAME contained a ND entry, i.e. 
not declared, and were assigned the  value  of zero. This could downwardly bias the value  of the 
dependent variable. This problem was attenuated by the fact that these entries were collapsed into 
yearly figures. Furthermore, we relied only on one source to gather data on social donations and only 
on publicly traded firms, which left out other possible social activities of sampled firms as well as 
several firms that were listed in the Guia EXAME that were not publicly traded companies. For these 
reasons, one would expect large measurement errors for firm donations. Since we did not expect our 
data on firm donations to be fully reliable, we could set firm donation construct reliability at 0.7, the 
least commonly expected. However, this estimation showed offending estimates and did not improve 
goodness-of-fit indices. Nevertheless, our final model predicted firm donation reasonably well. 
       
       
C C C CONCLUSIONS ONCLUSIONS ONCLUSIONS ONCLUSIONS       
       
 
We  can  outline  three  conclusions  from  these  results:  (a)  discretionary  donation  seems  to  be  a 
strategy for managing stakeholder claims; (b) firms’ characteristics are more important than industry 
effects in explaining firm donations; and (c) large firms with slack resources and a less concentrated 
ownership structure tend to show strong stakeholder orientation. Managers in stakeholder oriented 
firms seem to cope with conflicting stakeholder claims by using cash giving practices. 
Future  research  should  continue  to  enhance  construct  validity  for  both  industry  effects  and 
stakeholder  orientation  in  turbulent  environments,  following  Luk  et  al.  (2005)’s  argument  that 
different  institutional  settings  should  be  examined  for  stakeholder  management  differences.  These 
potential indicators have not been evident so far, and are still likely to be found.  
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